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THE UNITED NATIONS AND OCEANIA:
NEW DIMENSIONS IN THE COLD WAR REFRAIN
William O. Miller
Introduction. Stretching from thc
west coasts of the Americas to thc Asian
mainland lies the earth's most formidable water barrier-·the Pacific Ocean.
This mammoth body of water comprises
two-thirds of the ocean area of the
world and a full one-third of the earth's
surface. Interspersed throughout this
vast area are literally thousands of
islands, divided generally into the island
chains of Melanesia, Micronesia, and
Polynesia. Sincc Wcstern man has navigated these waters, these islands of
Oceania have becn sought after jealously
by the world's powers--first for the
pleasure and sojourn they offered, then
for their wcalth, and finalJy for their
strategic value. The peoples of thcse
islands were extremely divcrse in racial
haekground, culture, and social customs
and groupings. They had only one thing

in common. They were organized, if at
all, into small, fragmented, premodern
societies, with no effective capacity to
resist domination hy any power interested in exercising it. 1
The resulting scramble for hegemony
culminated in the late lUOO's in large
island groupings gradually becoming
subject to the colonial administration of
one or another of the Western powers.
Since that time, as national powers have
ebbed and flowed, sovereignty or control over most of these islands has
undergone frequent change. This is particularly true of the isb.nds of Micronesia which have been under the successive control of Spain, Germany,
Japan, and now the United States.
These Pacific outposts became, in the
early days of World War II, "foosteps,,2
for a militaristic Japanese expansion
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southward toward Australia, and Lhey
formed "a series of great spider webs
'made to order' as one Japanese admiral
said, to caLch any unwary nics LhaL tried
Lo crm;s the Pacifi(:. ,,3 Lall~r they ~.~rvcd
LllI~ f;:IIIIC pllrpOf;I\ for the llnill,(1 ~tat($
and its Allies in their successful efforts
to choke off the exposed extensions of
Japanese military power, and they provided successive rungs in the U.S. ladder
constructed for assault on imperial
Japan.
The strategic significance of Oceania
is a fact of modern history which
underscores Admiral l\']ahan's classic
analysis of the dependence on strategically located land hases for the effecLive
exercise of seapower.4 Located as they
are, athwart the maritime lines of communication from the Western Hemisphere to Southeast Asia, these islands
have once-and could again--provide
operaLing bases from which the.sealanes
supporting the projcction of power into
this area could be severed.
Such obvious strategic considerations
have not gone unnoted in the Soviet
Union, whose respresentatives are currently making significant efforts to recreate in the Pacific groupings of small,
fragmented politics, with no effective
capacity to resist domination by a
stronger power which is willing to risk
adverse world opinion to exercise it--to
create, once again, the very situation
which existed in this area in the latl\
19th cenLury. The modality of Lhe
Soviet approach is not the traditional
exercise of military power, but rather a
sustained political assault on Western
hegemony through the medium of the
United Nations and its "Committee on
the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples," commonly
known as the "Special CommiLtel\ of
TWI'nty-follr. "
This paper will traee the historical
anLCCl\(ltmts of the "Special CommiLLee
of Twenty-four," and it will thereafter

prcsent an analysis of the CommiLtee's
aCLiviLies, which are seen to refleet an
effective conversion hy the Soviet
IJnion of the international yearning for
~('lf-(ldenllillali()11 of pcoples illlo all
ullrdcntilll!: eold w'lr .1s-,,;lIIlt 011 W(!stern
presence in the Pacific Ocean area. The
ohjective of this assault is felt to be:
first, thc denial to the Western Powers,
principally the United States, of the use
of these island areas; and second, to
make them ripe for Communist political
subversion and ultimately for Communist exploitation.
International Concern for Dependent
Peoples: An Historical Sketch:
a. The Covenant of the League of
Nations_ From the timid beginnings of
article 22 of the Covenant of the League
of Nations, the efforts of the international community to bring ahout a
universal application of the principle of
self-determination of peoples have
assumed an ever-expanding scope. It will
he remembered that in the aftermath of
World War I the problem of the disposition of former enemy colonial possessions was resolved by the creation of the
League Mandate system under which
thcse tcrriLorics were theoretically taken
under internaLional contro\. Such territories whose peoples were" . _. not yet
ahle to stand by themselves under the
sLrenuous conditions of the modern
world" were entrusted to the tutClage of
"more advanccd nations" who were
willing to accept the "sacred trust of
civilization" and to provide for their
"well-being and development."
Whatever defects may have existed in
this system, and there were many,S it
mllst he said Lhat the very creation of a
scheme of even tenuous international
conLrol over colonial areas represented a
dramatic departure from prior practices.
It assumes even greaLer significance
whcn it is re(:ogllizcd that Lhis was a
voluntary act on the parL of the WesLern
nations whose past policies had heen to
ex Lend their own individual imperial
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control over widely dispersed colonial
possessions. 6 While it may be true that
the international control of the League
was of the colonial powcrs' own dcsign,
it did signal the hcginnings of a reform
movcmcnt under which the entire international community would seek to oversee the transformation of dependent
peoples toward self-determina~ion.
h. The Charter of the United Nations. The Second World War gave additional impetus to international concern
over the problems of dependent
peoples. Particularly was this true in the
United States where almost all responsible officials, including the President,
were of the view that the days of
colonialism were past and that in the
new postwar order there should be a
comprehensive trusteeship system embracing all dependent people. 7 Although no such all-pervasive system
developed, there were significant advances made toward more effective
international supervIsIOn. Again, it
seems important to note that these steps
were taken by the victorious mandatory
and colonial powers on their own initiative and despite strong opposition of
somes because of their recognition of
"the right of all people to choose the
form of government under which they
will live ... ,,9
This new order for dependent
peoples was to be structured on two
basic concepts: first, an expanded and
im proved in ternational trusteeship
system with a view toward the ultimate
"self-government or independence" of
the trust territpries;Io. and second, a
declaration by the colonial powers of
their duties toward, and the rights of,
the dependent peoples of all territories
who "have not yet attained a full
measure of self government. ,,11
(1) The Trusteeship System. The
newly created trusteeship system functioned under an institutionalized Trusteeship Council composed equally of
administering and nonadministering

powers.12 To be placed under this
system were the territories formerly
held under League Mandate, those
detached from enemy control as a result
of World War II, and those territories
which might be voluntarily placed undcr
the system by any of the. colonial
powers. 13 Only 10 of the formerly
mandated territories plus Somalilancl
were placed under Trusteeship Council
supervision.14 In the Pacific area these
included the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, formerly mandated to
Japan but now under the administration
of the United States; the Trust Territory
of New Guinea under Australian administration; and Western Samoa and Nauru
under New Zealand and Australian
administration, respectively.
Specific trusteeship agreements were
entered into wiLh the adminisLering
powers stating specifically the terms
under which the trust was to be exercised. The Trusteeship Couneil was invested with significant powers to oversee the exercise of these trust agreements. It was given authority to consider reports to be submitted regularly
by the administering powers, to receive
and examine petitions from inhabitants
of the territories, and to conduct visits
to and inspections of the territories
themselves. 15
It seems important to note at this
juncture that through the operation of
this system all of the original trust
territories, with the exception of New
Guinea and the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, had gained their independence by early 1968.
(2) The Charter Declaration of the
Rights of Dependent Peoples. While the
U.N. trusteeship system was essentially
an improved version of the League
Mandates, the truly "striking innovation ,,16 in this area affected by the
charter was the provisions of chapter Xl
and, more specifically, the provisions of
article 73. In this article the members of
the United Nations, including those
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administering dependent territories,
committed themselves to the proposition that the "interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount," and acceptcd as
•.. a sacred trust the obligation to
promote to the utmost .•• the wellbeing of the inhabitants ..• to develop
self government, to take due account
of the political aspirations of the
peoples, and to assist them in the
progressive development of their free
political institutions, according to the
particular circumstances of each territory and its people ....

The administering powers further agreed
to transmit regularly to the Secretary
General statistical reports on the economic, social, and educational conditions in their respective dependent territories.
The covenant's "sacred trust" was
thus proclaimed to embrace not only
the people of former enemy territories
but, indeed, to embrace the people of
all dependent territories. The colonial
powers had stated their formal recognition of the principle that their own,
long-held colonial possessions were now
wards of the international community
as a whole and that the objective of
their administrations, at least in the eyes
of the international community, was to
provide these people with such assistance as might be required for their
ultimate exercise of the right of selfdctermination. Significantly absent,
howcver, was any institutionalized
system to oversee the exercise of this
"sacred trust" with respect to any of
the non trusteeship territories.
c. The "Magna Carta" of Anticolonialism As noted above, the United
Nations trusteeship system has functioned so effectively that all but two of
the original 11 trust territories have now
gaincd thdr indcpendcm:c. Many explanations ('0111" hI: givml for this, not
the Irast of which could be that the
territories involved were not long-term
historical possessions of the adminis-

tering powers but, rather, wcre former
enemy territories of relatively recent
acquisition. Also, it is obvious that the
machinery of the charter gave the international community as a whole a rather
significant influence over these territories through the powers legislated to
the Trusteeship Council.
In the first 15 years of the United
Nations' operations, some 34 dependent
territories, including eight trusteeship
and 22 nontrusteeship territories, had
gained their independence. 17 Nevertheless, there remained at the end of 1960,
64 dependent territories under the
administration of colonial powers. 1II
While, therefore, there had been major
progress toward decolonization, it is
quite apparent that with respect to the
non trusteeship dependencies the progress was measurably slower than was the
case with those under Trusteeship Council supervision. It was to speed up this
process that the United Nations, augmented in 1960 with the admission to
membership of 17 ex-colonial states,
took such significant action that this
year must be described as the watershed
in the. "rising tide of decolonization."1 9
In a dramatic address before the
General Assembly on 23 September
1960, Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman
of the Council of Ministers of the
U.S.S.R., stated that the time had come
for the "complete and final abolition of
the colonial system in all its forms and
manifestations," and he submitted for
the consideration of the General Assembly a draft declaration calling for
the granting of immediate independence
to all trust and nonself-governing territories. 20 A modified Soviet proposal
later submitted proclaimed that in the
colonial territories "the swish of the
overseer's lash is heard ... [that]
... heads fall under the executioner's
axe," that all colonial counlries Illllst he
/.,'Tantell their int!epen"cnee forthwith
"and that all foreign hases in other
states must be e1iminated.,,2 1 Throughout the debates whieh followed, Soviet
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spokesmen continued this type of vitriolic attack on all forms of "Western
colonialism," giving particular and strident verbal attention. to the subject of
Western military bases in foreign countries and Western military alliances.
Western spokesmen answered these
attacks by accusing the Soviet Union,
itself, of adopting a new form of colonialism which "had been imposed by
force on people who had been free for
centuries." They also made a specific
point of stating their recognition of the
aspirations of all people who did not
presently enjoy a full measure of selfgovernment and expressed a profound
regret that the Soviet Union would
undertake to "pervert for its own purposes the deef and genuine desires" of
these peoples. 2
Recognizing the urgent need for a
resolution more moderate in tone than
that submitted by the Soviet Union, and
perhaps recognizing also the urgent need
to attempt to remove U.N. decolonization efforts from the center of the
East-West cold war struggle where it had
been cast by the Soviets, 43 Afro-Asian
nations collaborated in drafting a compromise resolution on this subject. This
resolution was submitted to the General
Assembly by Cambodia, and it was
adopted on 19 December ]960, as
General Assembly Resolution
ISI4(XV), by a vote of 89 to 0 with
nine nations, including all of the Western colonial powers, abstaining. 23
This declaration has been variously
described as a "capstone to the U.N.'s
efforts to supervise colonial regimes, ,,24
as a kind of anticolonialism "magna
carta,"25 and as "almost an amendment
to the charter.',26 Certainly, all of these
descriptions are accurate, since the resolution itse!e 7 speaks in broader and yet
more definite terms than has any similar
document in history. In its operative
paragraphs it declared:
1. The subjection of peoples to alien
domination and exploitation constitutcs a denial of fundamental human

rights, is contrary to the Charter of thc
United Nations and is an impediment
to the promotion of world peace and
co-operation.
2. All people havc thc right to selfdetermination; by virtue of that right
they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
3. Inadequacy of political, economic,
social or educational preparedness
should never serve as a pretext for
delaying independence.
4. All armed action or repressive
measures of all kinds directed against
dependent peoples shall cease •••
5. Immediate steps shall be
taken ... to transfer all powers to
the peoples of these territories, without any conditions or reservations,
in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, •.• in ordcr
to enable them to enjoy complete
independence and freedom.
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial
or total disruption of the national
unity and the territorial integrity of
a country is incompatible with the
purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations.
7. All States shall observe faithfully
and strictly the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations, the
Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the present Declaration
on thc basis of equality, respect for
the sovereign rights of all peoples
and their territorial integrity.

Without a single dissenting vote, the
General Assembly thus proclaimed what
must be regarded as an overwhelming
international consensus that the era of
colonialism was past and that all of its
remnants must give way to the right of
all people to self-determination.
While it is true that the General
Assembly is not a lawmaking hody, that
it can only recommend and not legislate, the overwhelming majority by
which this resolution was adopted and
the fact that not even the colonial
powers against whom it was primarily
directed dared vote against it indicate
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the persuasive moral force that underlay
it. Thus it must be said that, technical
legal arguments notwithstanding, the
international community regards it as a
morally, and perhaps legally, defensible
proposition that all peoples have a right
to self-determination, which "demands
the speediest possible ending of all
colonial relationships, and condemns
uLLerly any extension or reestablishment
of colonial rule.,,2 s
The political lessons long taught by
Western philosophers and statesmen had
thus come back full circle, and the
former pupils, now possessed of organized moral and political strength in
an international setting, were reminding
their former tutors in forceful terms of
the lessons learned. It does seem ironic,
however, that the Western nations have
appeared to abdicate their leading role
in this effort to their cold war adversaries in the Soviet Union.
d. The Committee of Twenty-four.
Seizing the initiative again in the next
session of the General Assembly, the
Soviet Union on 26 September 1961
complained that, despite the 1960
declaration, some 88 territories still
remained under colonial domination,
that no steps had been taken to transfer
administration to the indigenous
peoples, and that, further, "the colonialist powers' network of bases on foreign
soil was being used to hamper the
liberation of colonial peoples and jeopardize the independence of newly independent countries." The Soviets again
submitted a draft resolution for consideration,29 and, again, it was vitriolic
and vituperative in tone. It called, in
part, for the final and unconditional
liquidation of colonialism by not later
than the end of 1962 and for the
establishment of a special commission
to inquire into the situation with regard
to the implemenLlItion of the 1900
declaration. A compromise n:solution
was again proposed hy a grouping of
Afro-Asian states, which, after con-

siderable -discussions repeating the acrimony of the 1960 debates, was adopted
by an ovcrwhclming vote of 97 to 0
with only four abstentions.
Resolution 1654(XVI) of 27 November 1961 reaffirmed the provisions of
the declaration and called upon all
states to take action "without further
delay" to implement it. The resolution
also established a special committee of
17 members, to be appointed by the
President of the General Assembly, to
inquire into the situation regarding
implementation of the declaration and
to make appropriate recommendations
and suggestions. 3o In 1963, with the
addition to its competence of matters
involving the trust territories, this committee became the only U.N. body
under the General Assembly which was
concerned generally with all nonself•
••
31
govermng terri tones.
In early 1962 the President of the
General Assembly appointed the following states as members of the Special
Committee: Australia, Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Madagascar, Mali,
Poland, Syria, Tanganyika, Tunisia, the
U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, the
United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and
Yugoslavia.32 At the 17th session of the
General Assemhly, the membership of
the Committee 'yas expanded to a total
of 24 by the addition of Bulgaria, Chile,
Denmark, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, and
Sierra Leone. 3 3
With this composition it takes little
imagination to envisage the philosophy
which the Committee was to adopt and
the course of action it was to follow. It
does seem worthy of note that the
Committee, from its outset, was
weighed heavily against those powers
which administered dependent territories. Of the 24 Committee members,
12 were ex-colonial territories, four
were Soviet oriented, and only three
a d ministering powers--Austmlia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States
-were members. New Zealand, which at
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the time continued to administer the
Cook Islands and Niue and Tokelau
Islands, was not even represented; nor
were France and Portugal, both of
whom continued to administer several
dependent territories.
The Committee of Twenty-four and
the Pacific Islands.
a. Initial Consideration-Conflict with
the Trusteeship Council. As would be
expected from the membership of the
Special Committee, it gave its initial
attention to the African depcndent territories, and it would be fair to say that
the problems of these African dependencies have continued to be forcmost
in the Committee's considerations. Beginning in 1964, however, with the
formation of special subcommittees34
to study and report on nonself-governing territories in specific geographical
areas, the Committee significantly
broadened its activities. It was in this
year that it first began to study elosely
the Pacific Island dependencies. Some
16 Pacific Island areas were considered. 3s These areas were dispersed
throughout the central and western
Pacific, both above and below the equator, and comprised literally thousands
of islands--from Pitcairn with a land area
of only 4 square miles and a population
of only 126, to Papua and New Guinea
with land areas of over 180,000 square
miles and a combined population in
excess of 2 million. The Committee's
task was further complicated by the fact
that these island areas were administered by six separate administering
powers--the United Kingdom, the
United States, Australia, New Zealand,
France, and· Portugal.
The Committee met almost continuously during 1964, considering most of
the nonself-governing territories in the
Pacific in some detail. Reports were
submitted to the General Assembly
covering each of the territories COIlsidered, and recommendations were
made concerning each territory. AI-

though these differed in detail one from
the other, the same general thread ran
through them all--the Committee's insistence that progress toward self-determination in all of the territories was too
slow and that the people of each of
these areas should he given the earliest
opportunity to express their wishes with
regard to their future status "in accordance with well established democratic
proccsses under United Nations supervision." The reports were generally
accompanied by reservations from the
administering powers who felt either
that they did not accurately reflect the
conditions in the territory, that proposed visits to some of the territories
were outside the Committee's competence, or that progress toward self-determination was entirely consistent with
the needs and desires of the local
populations. 36
Two aspects of the 1964 Committee
reports deserve speeial consideration:
(1) the apparent conflict between the
Trusteeship Council and the heavily
oriented anticolonialism of the Special
Committee; and (2) the growing determination of the Special Committee that
complete independence must he the
goal sought for all dependent peoples,
regardless of their own needs or of their
possible future independent viability.
Concerning the first of these, the
Trusteeship Council's reports to the
General Assembly, while urging the
administering powcrs to continue their
efforts leading toward self-determination in their respective territories, did
express general satisfaction with the
political procedures being implemented
in each of them. 3 7 With respect to the
U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, the Council took special
note of the report of its visiting mission
that "no fully maturcd opinions" had
yet developed in the territory concerning its political future. Further, it expressed the hope that the "future Congress of Micronesia would direct its
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attention to all the possibilitic:s--from
indcpendencc to all other options-which lay open for the future of the
Terri tory. ,,3 g
The Trusteeship Council's reports
werc in marked constrast to the findings
of the Committee of Twenty-four that
the progress toward self-determination
in the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands "did not fully meet the requirements of the Charter" and of the 1960
declaration and that progress in New
Guinea and Nauru "had been slow and
adequate steps had not yet heen
taken.,,39
Another area of conflict arose in the
Special Committee's proposal to send its
own visiting mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. A strenuous
U.S. ohjection was voiced to such a visit
since it was considered that visiting
missions to trust territories were fhe
peculiar province ~f the Trusteeship
Council and, were, hence, outside the
competence of the Special Committee.
This objection was overruled by the
Committee by what has now hecome an
almost characteristic voting pattern of
16 to 5 with 2 abstentions. 4o
It is worth noting, also, that in its
1964 report on the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands, the Trusteeship
Council expressed an approval of several
possibilities of an ultimate status for a
dependent territory extending from
"independence to all other options_"
The Special Committee, on the other
hand, had from the beginning steadfastly opted for complete independence
as the only acceptahle goal. While this
may not he readily apparent on the face
of the Committee's reports, it does
become clear when one notes that the
Committee consistently refers only to
the 1960 declaration which speaks in
terms of "complete independence." The
two bodic$ congis(('ntly i~norc(1 one
anothl'r, 1I11I11,,'rhal's more pertincnt the
(;cncrlIl Assembly Resolution which
proclaims the Assembly's understanding
of the term "self-determination." On 15

Decemher 1960, only 1 day after the
1960 declaration was adopted, the
Gencral Assembly adopted Resolution
1541(XV), which provides in pertinent
parts as follows: 41 "A Non-Self-Governing Territory ean be said to have
reached a full measure of self-government hy: (a) Emergence as a sovereign
independent state; (b) Free association
with an independent state; or (c) Integration with an independent state." By
ignoring this resolution in its entirety
and by consistently reiterating only the
theme of the 1960 declaration, the
Committee clearly indicated an unwillingness to accept any status short of
"complete independence" as a satisfactory conclusion of the self-determination process. That such a proposition
would not he permitted to prcvail over
the freely expressed desires of a local
population for political association with
its administering power fortunately was
demonstrated hy the 1965 resolution of
the General Assembly, GA RES
2064(XX), approving the results of a
plebiscite in which the Cook Islanders
elected free association with New Zealand rather than complete independence. 42
Another questionable acti~ty of the
Committee, which first hecame apparent in 1964, is its announced determination to carry another of the declaration's principles to extreme lengths,
that no reason-smallness, isolation, inadequate political, economic, social, or
educational preparation--should impede
the granting of independence. In its
1964 reports on the small island territories, the Committee' declared that,
regardless of their size, the "provisions
of the Declaration were fully applicable
to ... [them] ... and that appropriate
measures to this end should he taken
without delay."
Thc absurd sitlllltion which this ~()rt
of thillkin~ clIn bring IIlIout ill illustrated
by the fact thaL ill Jalluary 196B Lhc
Territory of Nauru, with a land area of
only 8 square miles and a tolal popula-
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tion of only 4000 persons, became an
independent, sovereign state.43
h. Renewed conflict and the Military
Bases Issue. The Committee's 1965
proceedings brought forth once again
what was now becoming a familiar
refrain. The Soviet Union, supported by
its Communist friends and by most of
the former colonial states, continued ~o
urge and condemn the slowness of the
pace toward independence, and for the
first time the Soviet Union specifically
went on record as opposing any s_ort. of
merger between the admmistenng
powers and their dependent territories. 44· More significantly, however,
the U.S.S.R. used the Committee as a
vehicle to continue its cold war assault
on Western military bases on foreign
soil, and particularly to condemn those
located in dependent territories. As a
result of the Committee's recommendations, a draft resolution was adopted by
the General Assembly's Fourth Committee which stated that the existence of
military bases in dependent territories
"constituted an obstacle to the freedom
and independence of these territories"
and called upon the administering
powers to dismantle them. When presented to the General Assembly, although these provisions received a 48 to
37 affirmative vote, they were held to
have been rejected since they did not
receive the two-thirds majority required
for an "important question," which the
President of the Assembly considered
them to be. This procedural ruling was
to obtain for less than 1 month, however, and on 20 December 1965 a U.S.
objection based on this point was overruled; and by a simple majority the
General Assembly adopted Resolution
2105(XX), requesting the "colonial
Powers to dismantle their military bases
in colonial Territories and to refrain
. new ones. ,>4 5
f rom esta bl 'ISIHng
The conflict betwccn the Special
Committee and the Trusteeship Council
becamc more obvious in 1965. With

respect to all the three remaining trust
territories, the Trusteeship Council
arrain
indicated general satisfaction• with
b
the progress heing made. In COlIlllIg to
these conclusions, the Council had
spccifically rejected Soviet proposals
which would have condemned the
administering powers' discharge of their
trusts.46 The Spccial Committce, however, reported to the General Assembly
in almost the same critical terms which
had been rejected by the Trusteeship
Council. The voting strength of the
anticolonialist bloc in the General Assembly was clearly illustrated by the
resolutions adopted in which, on two of
these territories, 4 7 the General Assembly only took note of the conclusions of the Trusteeship Council while
affirmatively endorsing "the recommendations and conclusions of the Special
Committee. "
This vote left little doubt that, at
least as far as the General Assembly was
concerned, the Special Committee, with
its strong anticolonialist bias reflecting
that of the General Assembly, would
thereafter be considered the U.N.'s principal anticolonialist tool, regardless of
the provisions of the charter.
This has certainly been the case sincc
1965. A procedure seems to have been
adopted under which subcommittees,
without even "token representation" of
the administering powers, will provide
critical reports to the Committee which
will then, almost in haec verba, endorse
the subcommittee's criticism and forward it to the General Assembly which
will do likewise. This has resulted in
General Assembly resolutions during
both 1966 and 196748 which have, in
ever more strident language, condemned
the "negative attitude" of the administering powers and their "repression of
colonial peoples"; reasserted that colonialism is "incompatible with the
Charter"; rciterated that "the cstablishment of military basis and installations
in these territories is incompatihle with
the purposes and principles of the
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Charter ... and of General Assembly
Resolution lS14(XV)"; requested that
existing military installations be dismantled; and, finally, deplored the refusal of the administering powcrs to
admit Committee missions to the dcpcndent territories and requested that such
missions be accepted.
c. Conversion of the Anticolonialist
Cause into a Second Cold War: the
Military Bases Issue Crystallized. Both
the Committee and the Gencral Assembly debates which preceded the above
resolutions demonstrate that the former
colonial states, to which "no issue
exceeds in importance their commitment to securing a speedy and complete
end of Western colonialism,'>4 9 have
permitted themselves to be drawn by
the U.S.S.R. into vituperative attacks on
the Western states and particularly on
the United States. Thus, their initial
reluctance to enter this "second cold
war"s 0 has long since passed. The debates on the military bases issue provide
clear evidence of this. At the beginning
of its 1967 sessions the Committee
heard the Soviet Representative, supported by many other members, condemn the existence of military bases in
all dependent territories and state that
"the utilization of military bases on
Guam ... showed that they created an
obstacle to independence. ,,5 1 The
Soviet Union also used the Committee
forum in 1967 to urge that the United
States should be requested to dismantle
its military bases in the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands, the provisions of
the strategic trusteeship agreement notwithstanding. 5 2
In May of 1967 letters were dispatched to each of the administering
powers asking for information on their
military activities in the territories
under their administration. In July and
August 1967 replies were recdved from
Australia, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. NOIH~
were willing to provide such informa-

tion, contending that their obligation to
provide information on their territories
was subject to security limitations and
that the subcommittee had no right to
ask for this type of information from
them. As might be expected, this
brought forth a rash of criticism of the
Western Powers who, it was said, had
the temerity to "challenge the Committees' right to information" and whose
real purpose was to use their military
bases "against freedom loving
people. ,,53
Although no more specific condemnation of military bases in the Pacific
territories emerged from the Committee's 1967 sessions than the relatively
mild recommendation that the military
activity of the United States on Guam
should be reduced,S 4 the mere fact that
this recommendation was macIe, based
as it was on Sovict complaints that
Guam was being used as a base for U.S.
aggression in Vietnam, lends credence to
the proposition that the force of a clear
majority of the Committee's members
has been enlisted in the Soviet cold war
camp.
d. CriSis. The Committee's continued
insistence on immediate implementation
of the 1960 declaration and their continued rejection of any attempls by the
administering powers to demonstrate
that progress toward self-determination
in their respective territories was in the
best interests of lhc local populalion led
the U.S. Representative to complain
bitterly in early 196855 about what
were termed "serious defects in the
Committee's methods of work." He
stated that the stereotyped and persistent call for immediate independence
was improper since "it was doubtful if
independence was feasible" for all of
them. He also "deplored the breakdown" in communicalions within the
Committcc which frequcntly led to the
exclusion of Representalives of the
administering powers when resolutions
were being drafted which were of par-
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ticular concern to them. He ended his
presentation with the startling announcement that
... lIn} view of the Committee's
methods of work and the difficulties
they have created for his delegation,
the United States questioned whether
any purpose would be achieved by
further participation in the work of the
Committee and was considering withdrawal. After consulting with other
delegations, however, his delegation
had decided to defer its decision on
that question.

The United Kingdom also made
strong complaints about the Committee's methods of work and provided
suggestions for their change as well as
for changes in the Committee's organization. 56
The ensuing debates saw, not an
attempt by the Committee to structure
its activities with a purpose of achieving
more progress towards its goal by diplomatic means, but, rather, a strident
renewal of cold war invective. The
Soviet Representative caustically attacked the United States as "relentlessly
undermining the efforts of the United
Nations to end oppression ... [and]
... attempting to crush the people of
Vietnam under the force of arms." He
accused the United States of occupying
for many years "a number of Territories
in the Pacific ... and transforming them
into air and naval bases and instruments
of its struggle against dependent
peoples.,,57 Syria said that the United
States and the United Kingdom were
trying to "ridicule the Committee and
discredit it." Yugoslavia and India contended that the real difficulty was not
the Committee's methods, but the refusal on the part of the administering
powers to cooperate. Bulgaria and
Poland supported these criticisms and
added their own charges of "perpetuating the colonialist yoke," "ruthless
foreign exploitation," and the use of
these small territories "as sites for military bases" through which to further
their aggressive purposes. Finally, the

Representative of Mali echoed the Communist line by arguing that the "subtle
attempts" to restrict the Committee's
activities were "only an extension of the
desperate ... [dcath throes] ... offcnsivc unleashed hy the coalition of reactionary neo-colonialist and imperialist
forces. ,,5 8
With these stinging and bitter accusations at the beginning of the 1968
Committee sessions, the Communist
states, with support from the former
colonial states, gave warning that they
intended to utilize the anticolonialist
cause to its full measure in their cold
war attacks on the United States. It
soon became clear, viewing the matter
from strictly a Pacific Ocean perspective, that the Soviet Union had now
launched a full-scale offensive against
the U.S. military bases in the Pacific
which were being used so effectively to
support the extension of U.S. power
into Southeast Asia and which obviously could be used in the future to
support a continued and strong U.S.
presence throughout the Pacific. The
U.S. bases on Guam drew particularly
extensive condemnation. It was contended that they were typical examples
of how the existence of military installations were having a negative effect "not
only on the liberation of their people
but also on internation'al relations in
general," and that they were being used
"for intervention and aggression against
the people of Viet-Nam. "S 9 Guam was
described as "nothing but a vast military
base .... [whose] ... population had
been indueted into the foreign
army,,,60 and the United States was
accused of using the islands of the Trust
Terrilory of the Pacific Islands as missile
and airbases and of planning a further
expansion of its military activities in
that area. Australia was attacked for
what was said to be "military preparations ... [in Papua and New
Guinea] ... for the conduct of the aggressive war in Viet-Nam and for the
direct induction of indigenous soldiers
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into that war.,,6 1
During these 1968 proccedings the
Representative of the Soviet Union
spelled out succinctly what lay behind
the Soviet offensive. In one of his most
biting attacks to date, he said on 25
June 1968: 62
The infonnation before the Committee
showed that the strategie signifieance
of small Territories, especially islands,
had increased, because they could be
used for supporting far.reaching m~
tary operations. That was particularly
true of the island of Guam, a United
States Colony in the Pacific Ocean,
which had been turncd into a military
fortress ..• [Tlhe military headquarters of the region, an American Naval
base at Apra Harbour, the Agana naval
air station and the Anderson Air Force
Base were on Guam. Some 38,500
servicemen and their dependents had
been attached to these bases in 1967.
The Anderson Air Force Base was the
staging point from which the B-52
bombcrs wcre used for the aggressive
war against the Viet-Namese people
who wcre battling for their freedom
and independence ••. and Guam was
being used ••. for Polaris submarines
which were patrolling Chinese waters.

This should have made it crystal clear,
even to those who would not see it
before, that the Soviets' true purpose is
the conversion of the U.No's efforts
toward self-determination into one of
its principal cold war weapons. To
deprive the United States of the strategic island bases from which its power
can be effectively projected in aid of a
small nation under Communist pressure
or attack would be a major cold war
victory indeed.
At the time of this writing no results
of the Committee's studies on military
activities in the dependent territories
have been announced. It seems likely,
however, that it will once again condemn the administering powers and that
it will once again resolve that their
military activities in these territories
hinder progress towards self-determination and that they should cease. It is
only to be hoped that the former

colonial m~mbers of the Committee will
come to see how their desire for the
self-determination of all peoples is being
capitalized upon and lIsed by the ComJIIunist stutcs und that they will not
permit the Committee's reports and
recommendations to be further utilized
as a source of international support of
Communist cold war objectives. Itdoes
seem obvious, however, that the majority of the Committee has permitted
its purpose to be converted from that of
an international overseer of the selfdetermination process into that of a
forum for propaganda ilssaults on the
U.S. presence in Southeast Asia and in
the Pacific Ocean area in general.
Whether or not the United States will,
or should, continue to participate in the
Committee's work in the face of such
unreasoning assaults is a matter which
will have to be given careful consideration before the 1969 sessions begin.
Conclusion. There is no question but
that the yearning of the world's peoples
for control over their own political
destinies is a fact of 20th century life
which must be intelligently dealt with
by the present administering powers,
the dependent peoples themselvcs, and
the international community as a whole.
There also seems to be little doubt that
the activities by the United Nations, to
date, both in the Trusteeship Council
and in the Special Committee of Twenty-four, have given considerable momentum to the self-determination process.
The independence of Nauru and the
U.S. announcement of a planned 1972
plebiscite in the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands63 are only the most
recent evidence of the effect of international pressure through these U.N.
organs. What seems to be lacking in the
process, however, at least as viewed by a
majority of the members of the United
Nations, is the realization that the continued insistence on "complete independence" as the only acceptable goal
of the self-determination process can,
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and undoubtedly will, lead to the same
type of fragmented, nonviable, political
picture in the Pacific as that which
created world tensions in the 19th and
first half of the 20th century. Certainly
the anticolonialists are right when they
describe the struggle for colonial empires as a source of world conflict which
can lead to war, -and if this type of
conflict is to be avoided in the future, it
seems essential that conditions should
not be re-created which could lead to
this same type of instability and struggle.
This is not to say that the peoples of
any particular Pacific Island territory
should not be enabled to opt for complete freedom, unassociated with any
stronger power, if it is their desire to do
so. It is to say that these people should
not be pushed into such an option if it
is really not in their best interests.
The smallness, the isolation, and the
lack of adequate economic resources to
make them self supporting, clearly dictate for almost all of these areas some
sort of association-at least economic
and defensive-with a stronger power
which can provide continuing assistance
to them. As political opinion in these
areas matures, it should become obvious
to the people that such an association,
rather than complete freedom, will be
most conducive to their long-term interests. It is therefore considered that given

the time and the opportunity to develop
their political maturity, self-determination in these small island territories will
follow the lead of the Cook Islanders--a
free association with the administering
power which leaves the population in
complete control over its internal
processes but which continues the
responsibility of the administering
power over external affairs.
There is a very distinct danger existing, however, in the failure of the former
colonial members of the United Nations,
and more specifically those on the Committee of Twenty-four, to discern the real
interests of the peoples of the Pacific
Island dependencies. These nations have
been led to commit their voice and their
vote to the Soviet cold war cause, a cause
which, although using self-determination
as a banner, perverts that banner into a·
weapon through which it can attack the
very nations that gave self-determination
its start.
A crucial diplomatic problem for the
United States today, and indeed for the
people of the Pacific Island dependencies themselves, is to prevent this
type of Communist distortion to so
hasten the self-determination process in
the Pacific so as to resull in long-term,
serious disadvantage to the local peoples
by the re-creation of conditions which
will make them ripe for a new scramble
for hegemony.
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